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ABSTRACT 
Theory suggests that the Vickrey auction should accurately measure the " true" value of 
an auctioned good (Valuei = Bid,). When these values are homegrown, there is concern over 
individuals not revealing their true preferences in the laboratory, due to changing their bids 
(strategic bidding). Fears that the Vickrey auction is inadequate in eliciting "true" values have 
prompted us to test an alternative exchange institution- the random N-th price auction- to 
improve the measurement of value. Our results suggest that the Vickrey auction is sufficient 
in eliciting homegrown values. 
INTRODUCTION 
Smith (1982) identified three important elements of behavior in microeconomic systems 
in experimental economics. These three elements fonn a triad consisting of the environment, 
the institution, and the observed behavior itself. The testing of alternative institutions given 
induced values in the laboratory has been used frequently ever since Smith developed the 
induced valuation framework. With the luxury of controlling the preference environment, 
economic experimentalist can observe, with precision, the behavior which marufests in different 
exchange institutions. 
In eliciting homegrown values, especially for deliverable non.market goods, the 
Jaboratory provides an alternative to contingent valuation surveys, where problems may arise 
from individuals having unclear and undefined incentives. However, here we reverse the triad 
so that we need an exchange insti tution that will accurately measure these homegrown values. 
These homegrown values in experimental markets are similar to values obtained in real markets 
because these experimental institutions create a valuation environment with tangible incentives 
(Shogren et al., 1994) such that it greatly reduces the possibility of individuals having undefined 
incentives. Furthennore, in studies measuring the value of a nonmarket good, such as food 
safety, experimental auction markets seem to work reasonably well (Shogren et al. , 1994). 
Although these economic values are elicited or induced (as is the case with this 
experiment), there still exists a concern why people change their bids from their .. true" values 
in auction markets. Particularly in Vickrey sealed-bid second-price auctions, where the 
dominant strategy is to bid one' s "true" value, why does an individual, who claims that an 
auctioned good is worth one dollar, bid 95 cents or $1.15? Kagel et al (1987) concluded that 
in second-price auctions, the dominant strategy equilibrium does not prevail-bids consistently 
exceeded private values due to ad hoc reasoning. Coppinger et al. (1980) found that second-
price sealed-bid auction prices tended to be below the optimum price, but bidding above the 
private values were not allowed in that experiment. 
According to Harrison et al. (1995), a reason repeated Vickrey auctions may not always 
reveal "true" values is that strategic bidding is present. One way, Shogren et al. (1994) 
2 
suggested, to test the bid sensitivity is with the use of a random N-th price auction. The random 
N-th price auction was designed to reduce strategic bidding within repeated auctions by 
revealing "more information to the bidder about the distribution of values, while avoiding the 
repeated strobe light on the exact selling price, and by severing the direct connection between 
value, the market price, and the bid" (Shogren et al. ,1994). 
This thesis examines some alternative explanations to why people change their bids by 
comparing two different auction institutions, and observing respective impacts on behavior. 
Because the random N-th price auction is untested with induced values, this new experiment 
proceeds to compare elicited values from the random N-th price and the Vickrey auctions. If 
bidding behavior is clearly different between the Vickrey and the N-th price auctions, one 
auction institution may be superior to the other in the measurement of value. Hence, we step 
back to test the following hypotheses: H.; Vickrey bid = induced value; H~ Random N-th Price 
bid = induced value; H0 : Vickrey bid = Random N-th Price bid. 
Results suggest that there are no significant differences between the Vickrey and the 
random N-th price auctions in incentives for an individual to reveal their true values. The 
random N-th price auction works equally as well as the Vickrey auction in revealing true 
preferences. In comparing the optimal bidding, both auctions are similar to each other. The 
fears conveyed by researchers regarding over- or underbidding may be overblown. Except in 
rare occasions, deviations from "true" values were small, and for the most part, the median bid 
was equal to their respective private values. A critical question one must ask is do these small 
deviations (over- or underbidding) affect the measurement of "true" preferences in the 
laboratory? It seems on the average that the Vickrey auction mechanism captures the measured 
"true" value quite weJI , even in the repeated trial environment. 
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EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
Table I summarizes the design parameters of other experiments used for reference and 
our new design. We construct the experiment to detennine whether the Vickrey or the random 
N-th price auction influences the subjects to reveal their " true" values truthfully. As listed in 
Table 1, the fixed design parameters are (i) the auctioned good- a token; (ii) initial monetary 
endowment of $5.00; (iii) number of trials per stage-5 trials with only 1 bindjng in order to 
control for wealth effects; (iv) subject participation from the student population at lowa State 
University on a strictly voluntary basis; and (v) we described the optimal strategy without 
explicitly saying, "Bidding your uue value is the optimal strategy." 
Table 2 summarizes the actual experimental design. There were four groups of 8 to 10 
participants. All groups participated in all three stages of the experiment. The stages were in 
an ABA format, where A = Vickrey and B = Random N-th Price for groups 1 and 2, and vice 
versa for groups 3 and 4. Groups 1 and 2 had a different sequence of auction types than groups 
3 and 4 to control for order effects. Before the introduction of a new auction, two practice trials 
were conducted, and a written quiz was given to all participants to minimize any confusion or 
misunderstanding of the procedures. For the random N-th price auctions, the N-th price was 
predetermined via a random number generator, where N could take on values 2, 3, 4, or 5. 
Table 3 li sts the randomly determined private values. Before each stage of the 
experiment, subjects were given new private values from the distributions in Table 3- D 1 
corresponds to stage 1, 0 2 corresponds to stage 2, D3 corresponds to stage 3, and PR 
corresponds to the practice trials. Randomly assigned private values were varied to reduce 
feelings of discouragement by participants who receive a low private value in the first stage. 
The key rufference with previous Vickrey auction experiments is that the bidder kept the same 
induced value for all five trial s. We did this to observe individual differences and strategic 
behavior between trials. Keeping the same induced value from trial 1 to trial 5 in each stage, 
we held the individual and private value constant, hence we can observe bidding behavior 
between trials, while eliminating individual differences in bidding behavior due to rank of the 
induced value. Furthermore, assigning different induced values for each trial, instead for each 
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Table 1. Summary of Experimental Design Parameters 
Design Shogren et Hoffman et Coppinger et Kagel et al. New 
Parameter al. ( 1994) al. ( 1993) al. ( 1980) (1987) Experiment 
Auctioned Candy Bar, New A A A 
Goods sandwich, Packaging Redeemable Redeemable Redeemable 
and mugs for Fresh Object Object Object 
Beef (token) 
Initial $3 : candy 
Monetary bar $35 $0 $0 $5 
Endowment $15: mug or 
sandwich 
Number of 5: candy bar 
Trials 20: sand- 8 10-12 varied 5 
wich 
10: mugs 
Number of 
Subjects per 12 to 15 8 5 6 8-10 
Session 
Auction Sealed Bid, 5th Price, First and First Price Sealed Bid, 
Jnstitut ions Second Sealed Bid Second and Second Second 
Price Auction Price Price/ Price & 
Auction Auctions English Random N-
Auctions th Price 
Auction 
Optimal told told untold untold told 
Strategy 
SuN ect 
Participa- Voluntary Voluntary ? Voluntary Voluntary 
lion 
Preferences Homegrown Homegrown Induced Induced Induced 
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Table 2. Actual Experimental Design 
Design of Trials for groups 1 and 2 (n=9 for group 1, n= JO for group 2) 
Practice 1 Stage 1 Practice 2 Stage 2 Stage 3 
private value PR Dl PR D2 D3 
n-th price 22 22222 24 32423 22222 
auctions vv vvvvv RR RRRRR vvvvv 
Design of Trials for groups 3 and 4 (n=8 for group 3, n=lO for group 4) 
Practice 1 Stage l Practice 2 Stage 2 Stage 3 
private value PR D1 PR D2 D3 
n-th price 24 32423 22 22222 32542 
auctions RR RRRRR vv vvvvv RRRRR 
(R = Random N-th Price Auction, V = Vickrey Auction) 
Table 3. Randomly Determined Private Values 
Private Values 
PR [9.2, 8.4,6.7,6.4, 5.5, 3.9, 1.9, 1.1 , 0.6, 0.1] 
DI [9.6, 6.9, 6.7, 5.7, 5.5, 3.5, 2.9, 1.3, 1.2, 1. l] 
02 [9.5, 7.1 , 6.9, 6.0, 5.1, 4.9, 3.4, 2.5, 2.4, 0.8] 
DJ [7.7, 6.6, 5.6, 3.6, 3.3, 2.7, 2.2, 2.1, 1.0, 0.5] 
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stage, may cause confusion. Subjects were told that their private values were randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution of [$0.10, $10.00] in ten cent increments, and therefore they have 
an equal chance of receiving a private value from $0.10, $0.20, $0.30, .. .,$9.80, $9.90, $10.00. 
Subjects did not have knowledge of the distributions in Table 3. Identification numbers were 
also assigned to each participant, and reassigned only if it was revealed for any reason. 
All subjects were told the following optimal bidding strategy: "Although you may bid 
above or below your private value, it is to your advantage to bid your true value. If you bid 
above your true value, you increase your chances of paying more than what the token is worth. 
And if you bid below your private value, you decrease your chances of winning the auction." 
[t is important to note that although subjects were aware of the above statement, they were not 
explicitly told that it is the optimal strategy. Next the bid for the token was written on a 
recording card, and collected by the monitor. In the Vickrey auction, the second highest bid and 
the highest bidder' s identification number were posted. For the random N-th price auction, after 
all the bids were collected, N was revealed, and then the N-th highest bid along with the 
identification numbers of the bidders above the N-th price (in order from highest to lowest 
winning bid) were posted. The winner(s) was required to buy the token at the second or N-th 
price, depending on the auction. Immediately, the monitor bought the token back from the 
winner(s) at a price equal to his or her private value. A winner(s) of the auction earns a profit 
if his or her private value exceeded the market price, and earns a negative profit if private values 
were less than the market price. Each stage had five trials with only one trial out of five binding 
to control for wealth effects while preserving the repeated auction framework. 
The experiment proceeded as follows. The experiment was conducted at Iowa State 
University during different times for each of the four groups. Different subjects participated in 
each group for a total of 37 participants. This experiment was approved by the Iowa State 
University Hwnan Subjects Review Committee. See Appendix A for details of the experimental 
instructions. 
7 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics from all four groups. Each recorded bid was 
divided by the appropriate private value to obtain a bid to private value ratio, hereinafter referred 
to as the BVR. The calculations of the mean, median, and variance in Table 4 are obtained from 
these ratios. Therefore, if the mean equals unity, the average participant for a particular trial 
submitted a bid equal to his or her respective private value. In addition, values below unity 
suggest that the bids were below the private values; values above unity suggest that the bids 
exceeded the private values. From Table 4, the mean values are either above or below one, and 
rarely equal to one. This implies that the average subject, more often than not, did not reveal 
his or her true values. When looking at the median of the BVR, however, values are frequently 
equal to one, and sometimes Jess than one, but never greater than one. Thjs result suggests that 
the subjects did reveal their true values, and any deviations from bidding their true values ensued 
in underbidding, similar to Coppinger et al (1980) experiment, but without imposing the 
overbidding restriction. 
There are several measures of central tendency. The median captures the behavior of 
the bidders differently than the mean for several reasons. Primarily, in every group, there seems 
to be that one person who has an agenda totally different from the rest. He or she will over- or 
underbid dramatically, due to boredom or other reasons totally different from maximizing profit 
or minimizing loss. Given sample size, this type of behavior effects the mean more so than the 
median. For example, an individual may have a very low private value, such as 50 cents, and 
because that individual was told about how the private values were randomly selected, he or she 
may assume that it is the lowest private value, hence all possibilities of winning the auction and 
gainffig a profit is practically near impossible. In this scenario, he or she may feel discouraged, 
and bid zero, which would give a BVR of zero. When calcu:tating the mean-which has a lower 
bound of zero-this zero bid pu:tls down the average BVR, while not affecting its median value. 
Although an individual with a low private value may behave irrationally, the mean does not 
show that boredom or discouragement was the motivating factor behind the low BVR. In other 
words, when calcu:tating the mean a person with a private value of $9.60 who bids zero is treated 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics-BVR (average). 
TRIAL. 
GROUP 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Mean 0.816 0 .824 0.713 0.858 0.887 1.o45 1.021 1.041 o.- 1.030 0 .1181 0.1181! 0 .880 1.323 0.914 
Median 0.1182 1.000 t .000 0.9112 1.000 1.000 t.000 1.000 1,000 1 .000 1.000 t .000 1.000 1.()00 1.000 
Vanance 0.078 0 .124 0.138 0.108 0.()115 0.020 0.270 0.421 0.108 0.3111 0.001 0.252 0 .009 1.287 0.118 
2 Mean 0.1182 0.1187 0.1184 0 .975 O.llllll 0.802 O.ll07 0.900 o~ OJ;IOS 0.978 1.108 1.018 1.018 1.081 _,, 1.000 1.000 t .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 t .000 1.000 1.000 1 .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Vananoe 0.004 0 .001 0.002 0.004 0.007 o.on 0.1>88 0.078 0.087 O.o&Q 0.005 0.084 0.207 0.207 0.306 
3 Mean 0.1170 1.071 1.014 0.1141 0.11118 0.11112 1.015 0.1173 0 .1185 0.117'1 O.lll!O O.llllO o~ l .3UI 1.1113 
Medan 1.000 1.000 1;()00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Vananoo 0.012 0 .124 0.020 0 .013 0 .024 0.004 o.ooe o.ooe 0 .012 0.020 0.013 O.Ol:S 0.015 1.200 0.569 
4 Mean 0.11211 1M7 1..5611 1.630 1.6<18 0.11111 011251 0.940 0.1132 0.11113 1.000 1.007 0.1193 O.lllle O.llOll _,, 0.1)82 t .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0 .974 0.1184 1.000 0.9113 0.992 1.000 1.000 0.1185 1 .000 0.994 
Vananoo o .tse 2.092 2.478 2.417 2.891 o .ooe 0.0 10 0.019 0.051 0 .097 o.ose 0.098 0.022 0.001 o.on 
' Shaded.,... repr- Random N-lh Price Auction 'l.klal>aclKI ., .. repr...,111 Viclcrey Aucllon 
the same as an individual with a $0.50 private value who bids zero, although the repercussions 
for this behavior differs greatly between the two bidders. Similar to the mean, the median value 
does not show the motivating factor either, but it does tend to not reflect it in its calculation. 
Overbidding by someone with a low private value has a similar effect on the mean. 
Again other reasons, besides maximizing profit or minimizing loss, may be behind a bidder's 
behavior. For someone with a low private value there is no severe penalty for overbidding. How 
do the subjects know this? Frankly, although the subjects may not precisely know how low their 
private value is, they have a sense of their position in the distribution of the induced values. At 
trial one of each stage, a subject knows that the distribution is from 10 cents to I 0 dollars in ten-
cent increments~ therefore, if he or she receives a private value in the lower half of the 
distribution, say $3.00, the penalty for overbidding ten cents is not severe. This is also true for 
the random N-th price auction with the exception that the penalty may be a little greater, but 
potentially not severe enough to induce strict rationality. As the auction proceeds, in trial two, 
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the subject with a low private value has greater knowledge-due to the posting of the market 
price in the previous trial- that the punishment for overbidding is less likely to occur, and as 
the stages progress, the penalty for overbidding becomes practically non-existent. The same 
reasoning applies to underbidding penalties for subjects with lower private values. Furthermore, 
a bidder is aware of the range in which the private values come from, hence a bid of $1 .25 for 
someone with a low private value of 50 cents gives a BVR of 2.5. Unfortunately, in calculating 
the mean, it treats the above instance equally as someone, with a private value of $6.00, bidding 
$15 .00. ln retrospect, the median reflects the effectiveness of the auctions in measuring true 
preferences more accurately and j ustifiably than the mean. The median value avoids the wide 
swings due to outliers and bidders who are at the tail of the value distribution. 
After conducting a simple analysis of variance, the F-test showed that there was no 
significant difference between any of the four groups, hence all groups were pooled for further 
analysis. Next we tested if the bid = f(private value, trial, auction type, stage). Consequently 
private values, trial numbers, auction types, and stages were regressed on the bids. In the 
equation (1), Tnall. Tria/2, Tn a/3, Trial./, AuctionType. Stage / . and Stage2 are qualitative 
variables. Regression results show that P 1 is significant and we can reject H~ p 1=0 at the 0.01 % 
level. Equation (2) shows the model with its appropriate alues after the regression was run. 
Bid = a + p ,PrivateValue + P2Trial l + P3Trial2 + P4Trial3 + P5Trial4 + P6AuctionType + 
P,Stage l + P8Stage2 + P.;?rivateValue*Triall + Pu?rivateValue*Trial2 + 
P11PrivateValue*Trial3 • P12PrivateValue*Trial4 ,.. P13PrivateValue*AuctionType T 
P1-1PrivateValue*Stage I + P15PrivateValue*Stage2 + E ( J) 
Bid = 0.3968 + 0.9229PrivateValue - 0.33 17Trial 1 - 0.0178Trial2 + 0.0150Trial3 -r 
(.2397) (.0524) (.2736) (.2736) (.2736) 
0.0677Trial4 - 0.4463AuctionType + 0.2983Stage 1 , 0.0860Stage2 , 
(.2735) ( 1736) (.2027) (.2244) 
0.0592Pri vateValue*Trial 1 + 0.0027PrivateValue*Trial2 -
( 0556) (.0556) 
0.0275PrivateValue*Trial3 - 0.0277PrivateValue*Trial4 + 
(.0556) (. 0556) 
0.0666PrivateValue*AuctionType - 0.0560PrivateValue*Stagel -
(.0353) (.0450) 
0.0575PrivateValue*Stage2 - E (2) 
(0467) 
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Further regressions were needed to observe any statistical differences between trials and 
auctions. The requisite ( restricted) F-test show no significant difference between trials 
(F8.539=0.5056) at the 5% level. In other words, the bids did not differ between trials (Trial 1 = 
Trial 2 = Trial 3 = Trial 4 = Trial 5) or it suggests no learning occurred between trials within 
each stage. The Chow test for structural differences show a significant difference between 
stages (f 12. 131=2 .541 ) at the 5% level , which implies that the bids did differ between stages 
structurally. Moreover, the (restricted) F-test reponed no significant difference between stages 
(F4•539=1.572) at the 5% level. This states that the bids did not differ between the three stages 
(Stage 1 = Stage 2 = Stage3) or it suggests no learning occurred between the three stages. The 
Chow test show a signifcant difference between trials (F8•539=23.901) at the 5% level , which 
implies that the bids did differ between trial s structurally. The Chow Test for structural 
differences show no significant difference between auctions (F 14.525= 1.6845). This states that 
the bids did not differ between the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions structural ly. On 
the other hand, the restricted F-test show significant difference between auctions (F 2.539=3.4825). 
Consequently, these results suggest that the bid is a function of private value (Bid = f(Private 
value)) or otherwise-depending on which statistica l test is appropriate (see Appendix B). 
Furthermore p1 is equal to 0.9229, which we have found to be significantly different from 
zero, but is it significantly different than one (Ho: p 1= 1 )? T-tests show that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance. Our inability to reject that p 1= 1 statistically 
supports that the average participant in both auctions did reveal thei r true preferences. Table 
5 summarizes the regression results. 
Looking at the median BVR, a nonparametric test is conducted to calculate simple linear 
rank statistics based on Wilcoxon scores (Table 6). Via the Kruskal-Wallis test, the independent 
variables, Trials and Stages, are not significant (X 7=0.86702, x 1=0.68416 respectively). ln other 
words, the distribution of the BVR has the same location parameter across all five trials, and 
likewise across all three stages. Via the Mann-Whitney U test, the independent variable 
Auct10ns is significant at 10%, but not at the customary 5% level (x.,-3.035). This result 
supports our hypothesis-Vickrey auction - random N-th price auction - when examining the 
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T bl 5 S a e ummarv o f R egress1ons. 
Regressions: 1 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 
:PAAAMETERS 
~nterceft 0 .39679**"" 0.34351** 0.211769 0.4723 1 0.255738 0 .439223 
(.23965) (.16519) (.20912) (.36431) (.41378) (.41471) 
'PrivateValue 0.922907* 0.924242* 0.926600* 0.891441* 0.927289* 0.927946* 
(.05238) (.03869) (.04898) (.08532) (.09691) (.09719) 
!rrial 1 -0.331686 - - - - -
(.27358) - - - - -
Trial 2 -0.01n92 - - - - -
(27358) - - - - -
Trial 3 0.015023 - - - - -
(27358) - - - - -
rTrial 4 0.067656 - - - - -
(.27343) - - - - -
Auction Type -0.44627* -0.44617* -0.18827 -0.58819 -0.60171 -0.27922 
(17362) (.17299) (.21902) (.38152) (.43333) (.42415) 
!Stage 1 0.298327 0.298205 -0.31035 0.270967 0.759939 0.276257 
(.20273) (.20200) (.2ssn) (.44553) (.50603) (.50687) 
~age2 0.086012 0 .085896 -0.04104 0 .067351 0.380248 -0.22081 
(.22440) (.22359) (.28309) (.49312) (.56009) (.56121) 
(PrivateValue •Tria/1) 0.059167 - - - - -
(.05558) - - - - -
(PrivateValue*Trial2) 0.002754 - - - - -
(.05558) - - - - -
(PrivateValue *T ria/3) -0.02747 - - - - -
(.05558) - - - - -
(PrivateValue*Tria/4) -o.02n22 - - - - -
(.05556) - - - - -
(PrivateValue •Auction Type) 0.06662 0.06661** 0.019509 0.099171 0.087845 0 .032.233 
(.03535) (.03522) (.04459) (.On67) (.08822) (.08843) 
(PrivateVa/ue*Stage1) -0.05995 -0.05598 0.061427 -0.03374 -0 .15568 -0.0631 
(.04501) (.04485) (.05678) (.09889) (.11232) (.11262) 
(PrivateValue*Stage2) -0 .057483 -0.05747 0.026145 -0.03837 -0.09152 -0.05849 
(.04670) (.04653) (.05891) (.10261) (.11654) (.11685) 
ESS 605.9939 610.541 36.84445 111.7972 144.2223 145.0738 
A-squared 0 .834 0.8328 0 .949 0.8453 0.7991 0.7983 
!Adjusted A-squared 0 .8294 0.8307 0.9455 0.8348 0.7854 0.7846 
F Value 180.58 389.194 273.669 80.39 58.516 58.245 
Prob > F 0 .0001 0.0001 0 .0001 0 .0001 0.0001 0.0001 
MSE 1.12429 1.11616 o .35n1 1.08541 1.40022 1.40848 
Root MSE 1.06033 1.05649 0 .59809 1.04183 1.18331 1.1868 
N 555 555 111 111 111 111 
Regressions: (1) Full Model; (2) Restricted (trials) model; (2a) Restricted (tnal1) model; 
(2b) Restricted (trial2) model; (2c) Restricted (trial3) model; (2d) Restricted (trial4) model; 
(2e) Restricted (trial5) model. 
•significant at 1% ••significant at 5% •••significant at 10% (standard error in parenthesis) 
2e 
0.337487 
(.43282) 
0.948198* 
(.10137) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0.5746 
(.45328) 
0.486941 
(.52932) 
0.245265 
(.56587) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0 .094492 
(.09228) 
-0.08918 
(.11749) 
-0.12546 
(.12191) 
157.8053 
0.7947 
0.7808 
56.959 
0.0001 
1.53209 
1.23n8 
111 
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Table 5. (continued) 
Regressions: 3 3a 3b 4 4a 
IPAAAMETERS 
linterce,X 0 .169899 0.034863 0.310291 0.542170* 0.98828** 
(.22379) (.23730) (.37633) (.21203) (.43073) 
IPrJvateValue 0.95668* 1.01010* 0 .89912* 0.677102* 0.877637* 
(.04937) (.05139) (.08469) (.04353) (.08719) 
Trial 1 -0 .331686 -0.13852 -0.52398 -0.33169 -0.73189 
(.27463) (.29322) (.45959) (.27415) (.55337) 
Trial 2 -0.017792 -0.02273 -0.01221 -0.01779 -0.08011 
(.27463) (.29322) (.45959) (.27415) (.55337) 
Trial 3 0.015023 0.003764 O.Q19961 0.015023 0 .161749 
(.27463) (.29322) (.45959) (.27415) (.55337) 
Trial 4 0.067175 0 .225287 -0.09177 0.067354 0 .046726 
(.27468) (.29290) (.45959) (.27400) (.55337) 
IAictionType - - - -0.44539* -0.95990* 
- - - (.17352) (.35127) 
lstage 1 0.300755 -0.13475 0.68468** - -
(.20354) (.21395) (.34613) - -
!Stage 2 0.119526 -0.02694 0.219942 - -
(.22507) {.24619) (.35652) - -
(PriveteValue*T rial1 ) 0 .059167 0.022593 0.097936 0.059167 0.087634 
(.05563) (.05767) (.09634) (.05569) (.10977) 
(PrivateValue*Tria/2) 0.002754 0.004452 0 .000768 0.002754 0.001421 
(.00563) ( 05767) (.09634) (.05569) (.10977) 
(PriveteValue *T ria/3) -0.02747 -0.03251 -0.02037 -0.02747 -0.09205 
(.05563) (.05767) (.09634) (.05569) (.10977) 
(Private Value *Tria/4 ) -0.027636 -0 .05917 0.006256 -0.02769 -0.02676 
(.05562) (.05763) (.09634) (.05568) (.10977) 
(PrivateValue*AuctionType) - - - 0.06661** 0.074432 
- - - (.03532) (.07026) 
(PrivateVelue*Stage 1) -0.054651 -0.05121 -0.0445 1 - -
(.04516) (.04639) (.07691 ) - -
(PrivateValue*Stage2) -0.062209 -0.05909 -0.05737 - -
(.04688) (.05022) (.07636) - -
ESS 613.62463 169.5436 417.8934 613.061 176.6932 
A-squared 0.6319 0.9096 0 .764 0.6321 0.6372 
Adjusted A-squared 0 .6279 0.9054 0.7522 0.6267 0.6269 
F Value 205.936 206.384 64.984 244.644 60.904 
Prob > F 0 .0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
MSE 1 .13461 0.63736 1.6011 2 1.12903 1.0225 
RootMSE 1.06516 0.79636 1.26536 1.06256 1.01119 
N 555 260 275 555 165 
Regressions: (3) Restncted (auctions) model: (3a) Restricted (Vickrey auction) model; 
(3b) Restricted (random N-th price) model: (4) Restricted (stages) model : 
4b 
0.504355 
(.40041 ) 
0.627612* 
(.07312) 
-0.24067 
(.52684) 
-0.04957 
(.52684) 
0.043665 
(.52684) 
-0.23222 
(.52684) 
-0.36715 
(.33616) 
-
-
-
- -
0.095274 
(.09527) 
0.032682 
(.09527) 
0.008686 
(.09527) 
0.017434 
(.09527) 
0.079411 
(.06062) 
--
-
-
-
176.6932 
0 .6372 
0.6269 
60 .904 
0.0001 
1.0225 
1.01119 
165 
(4a) Restricted (stage1) model : (4b) Restricted (stage2) model; (4c) Restricted (stage3) model. 
*significant at 1 % * *significant at 5% ... significant at 10% (standard error in parenthesis) 
4c 
0.117723 
(.27561) 
0.954123* 
(.06758) 
0.070875 
(.35475) 
0 .127674 
(.35475) 
-0.09533 
(.35475) 
0.251446 
(.35427) 
-0.14029 
(.22426) 
-
-
-
-
-0.05984 
(.08683) 
-0.05435 
(.08683) 
-0 .02444 
(.06683) 
-0.05179 
(.08660) 
0 .091176 
(.05493) 
-
-
-
-
124.2716 
0.6761 
0.6683 
111.256 
0.0001 
0.71633 
0.64755 
165 
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TabJe 6. Summary of Nonparametric Analysis. 
Class Mean Score Chi-Square Prob > Chi-Square 
TRIALS 1 thru 5 - 0.86702 0.9292 
Trial 1 269.8198 - --
Trial 2 281 .3964 -- -
Trial 3 275.1667 - --
Trial 4 276.8243 -- -
Trial 5 286.7928 - --
BOTH AUCTIONS - 3.0350 0.0815 
Vickrey 267.3429 - --
Random N-th Price 288.8509 - --·-
ST AGES 1 thru 3 -·-- 0.68416 0.7103 
Stage 1 273.9297 --- --
Stage 2 274.8703 - --
Stage 3 285.2001 - ---
All values are based on a nonparametric procedure using Wilcoxon 
scores for the dependent variable BVR. 
OF 
4 
-
-
--
-
-
1 
-
--
2 
-
-
-
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median values. 
Referring to the design of the experiment, each participant bids five times in each of the 
three stages. When several measurements (bids) are taken from the same individual, the 
measurements may be correlated with each other. The correlation was taken into account by 
perfonning a repeated measures analysis of variance (error components model). For each stage, 
private values and auction types were regressed on each bid (Table 7). ln the following equation 
(3), Auction is a qualitative variable. 
Bidl...Bid5 = a + p1 P-Value + PiAuction + P?-Value*Auction + E (3) 
Regression results show that p 1 is significant in all equations, therefore we can reject H~ 
p,=O at the 1 % level. Can we reject ij : p =1 for all equations? T-tests show that the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected for all equations at the 5% level of significance, except for one 
equation-Bid 1 in Stage 3. Generally, our inabihty to reject the null supports that the average 
participant in both auctions did reveal their true preferences. Furthermore in Table 7, the 
significance of the intercept is noticeably frequent in stage one than in stage two or stage three. 
This may imply some learning is taking place. 
An alternative statistical test- an unbalanced analysis of variance via generalized least 
squares-is performed to see if the main effects are significant. In this model , our main effects 
consisted of the 5 trials, 2 auctions, and 3 stages-each were assigned to a classification level. 
The results show that there is no significance for all main effects, except for the 2 auctions. This 
main-effect significance states that the mean of the dependent variable (BVR) is different for 
each level of the factor (Vickrey and random N-th price), ignoring the other independent 
variables in the model. Unfortunately, the model as a whole (adjusted for the mean) explains 
the dependent variable's behavior rather poorly (F-value = 1. 75, not significant at the 5% level). 
If the model itself is inferior, can we confirm the significance of its independent variables 
respectively? 
We can see in detail whether the rank of the induced private values had any noticeable 
15 
Table 7. Summary of Regressions: Repeated Measures Analysis (Error Components Model). 
Intercept P-Value Auction P-Value* F Value Pr > F R-Square N 
Auction 
BID 1 -0.18271 1.04536* -0.0807 -0.074 131 .09 0.0001 0.92258 37 
s (0.35498) (0.07669) (0.51062) (0.10213) 
T BID2 1.12842** 0.82812* -1.3748*** 0.16593 45.81 0.0001 0.80636 37 
A (0.56955) (0.11967) (0.79682) (0.15937) 
G BID3 1.3067*** 0.79556* -1.2735 0.06689 26.22 0.0001 0.70449 37 
E (0.68374) (0.14366) (0.95657) (0.19132) 
BID4 1.0117*** 0.85018* -0.91032 0.07142 37.42 0.0001 0.77283 37 
1 (0.60662) (0.12745) (0.84868) (0.16974) 
BID 5 1.1036*** 0.83841* -1.16015 0.14194 43.84 0.0001 0.7994 37 
(0.57908) (0.12167) (0.81014) (0.16203) 
BID 1 0.21262 0.93851* -0.27704 0.04804 373.94 0 .0001 0.97142 37 
s (0.21136) (0.03941) (0.31999) (0.05770) 
T BID2 0.39466 0.86683* -0.2458 0.06349 55.12 0.0001 0.83363 37 
A (0.51486) (0.09599) (0.77947) (0.14056) 
G BID3 0.64258 0.80678* -0.58921 0.13988 43.54 0.0001 0.79833 37 
E (0.56542) (0.10542) (0.85602) (0.15436) 
BID 4 0.15034 0.87784* -0.12039 0.01216 49.97 0.0001 0.81959 37 
2 (0.53120) (0.09904) (0.80421) (0.14502) 
BID 5 0.64298 0.80337* -0.7033 0.13358 36.42 0.0001 0.76804 37 
(0.61168) (0.11404) (0.92601) (0.16699) 
BID 1 0.3107*** 0.86173* -0.3797 0.1445** 329.26 0.0001 0.96767 37 
s (0.17429) (0.04289) (0.24429) (0.05981) 
T BID2 0.26938 0.90034* -0.21819 0.07699 102.25 0.0001 0.90287 37 
A (0.31323) (0.07708) (0.43903) (10749) 
G BID3 0.02378 0.92211 * -0.14255 0.09569 149.47 0.0001 0.93145 37 
E (0.26812) (0.06598) (0.37580) (0.09201) 
BID4 0.28166 0.91318* 0.01227 0.05936 45.64 0.0001 0.80579 37 
3 (0.47131) (0.11598) (0.66060) (0.16174) 
BID S 0.05793 0.98282* -0.02392 0.02569 44.02 0.0001 0.80007 37 
(0.50554) (0.12440) (0.70857) (0.17348) 
All parameter estimates are biased, and are not unique estimators. 
*significant at 1 % **significant at 5% ***significant at 10% (standard errors in parenthesis) 
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impact on the way individuals bid (Table 8). There seems to be no meaningful difference in 
bidding behavior between the highest and lowest private value. To see any differences between 
the upper and lower distributions of induced values, they were split into two halves-the lower 
half consisted of the lowest private value up to the fifth highest private value in the distributi.on; 
the upper half consisted of the sixth highest private value up to the highest private value in the 
distribution. Even after partitioning the induced private values by rank into two sections- upper 
and lower half- there still were no noticeable difference between the two. In the Vickrey 
auction, 56.26% of the persons in the upper half bid their true value, and 58.00% in the lower 
half. In the random N-th price auction, the two sections did not differ much either- upper and 
lower halves equaled 55.34% and 56.68% 
The next task was to see if the participants through experience were leamjng to bid their 
true values as the stages progressed in the experiment. Each auction type was observed by 
stages. A1though our regression results stated that the stages were not significantly different, 
in Table 9, it is suggestive that for both the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions some 
learning behavior exjsts between stages. In stage one, 51.58% of the participants bid their "true" 
value in the Vickrey auction, and 51.11 % of the participants bid their "true" value in the random 
N-th price auction. In stage two, the percentage of bids equal to their " true" values increases 
to 55.56% in the Vickrey, and increases to 56.84% in the random N-th price auction. In the final 
stage, it increases further to 63.16% and 64.44% for the Vickrey and the random N-th price 
auctions respectively. It should be noted that from these percentages, about 90% of the bids 
were less than or equal to the true values; hence it appears that overbidding was the exception 
and not the rule, contrary to the results of Kagel et al. (1987). Furthermore, bids and private 
values were plotted on a XY axis. Points on the 45 degree line represent a BVR = l , which states 
that an individual bid his or her true value. From casual observation, the points appear to be 
distributed closer to the 45 degree line in stage 3 than in stage 1 for both the Vickrey and the 
random N-th price auctions, which suggest some type oflearning exjsts (see Figures 1, 2, 3, and 
4). 
There was no substantial penalty for deviations from their private values by ten cents in 
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Table 8. Frequencies ofBVR arranged by rank of private values. 
Xl 
Vickrey 
nth price 
X2 
Vickrey 
nth price 
X3 
Vickrey 
nth price 
X4 
Vickrey 
nth price 
XS 
Vickrey 
nth price 
X l=highest private value ... XlO=lowest private value. 
(Percentage in parenthesis). 
< I = l > l X6 < I 
10 20 0 
(0.333) (0.667) (0.00) 
Vickrey 4 
(0.16) 
17 8 0 nth price 6 
(0.68) (0.32) (0.00) (0.2) 
< I = I > l X7 < I 
7 19 4 
(0.233) (0 .. 633) (0.133) 
Vickrey 12 
(0.48) 
8 6 6 
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3) 
nth price 15 
(0.5) 
< I = I > l X8 < I 
7 17 l 
(0.28) (0.68) (0.04) 
Vickrey 6 
(0.24) 
5 20 0 
(0.2) (0.8) (0.00) 
nth price I 
(0.033) 
< ] = ] > I X9 <I 
12 13 s 
(0.4) (0.433) (0.167) 
Vickrey 14 
(0.467) 
4 26 0 
(0.133) (0.867) (0.00) 
nth price I 
(0.033) 
< I = I > I X IO <l 
IS 12 3 
(O.S) (0.4) (0.1) 
Vickrey 5 
(0.2) 
4 12 9 
(0.16) (0.48) (0.36) 
nth price 11 
(0.367) 
= I > I 
21 0 
(0.84) (0.00) 
14 IO 
(0.467) (0.333) 
= I > I 
5 8 
(0.2) (0.32) 
12 3 
(0.4) (0.1) 
= I >1 
16 3 
(0.64) (0.12) 
29 0 
(0.967) (0.00) 
=l >1 
15 1 
(0.5) (0.033) 
16 l3 
(0.533) (0.433) 
=l > I 
18 2 
(0.72) (0.08) 
14 5 
(0.467) (0.167) 
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Table 9. Frequencies of BVR arranged by stages 
(Percentage in parenthesis) 
Stage l < l = I > l 
Vickrey 36 49 10 
(.3789) (.5158) (.1053) 
nth 24 46 20 
pnce (.2667) (.5 111 ) (.2222) 
Stage 2 <1 = I > ] 
Vickrey 31 50 9 
(.3444) (.5556) (.JOO) 
nth 24 54 17 
pnce (.2526) (.5684) (. 1789) 
Stage 3 < I = 1 > ] 
Vickrey 22 60 13 
(.2316) (.6316) (. 1368) 
nth 24 58 8 
price (.2667) (.6444) (.0889) 
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either direction when bidding, given the randomly selected private values came from a uniform 
distribution in ten-cent increments. Individuals had that ten-cent 1.eeway. For example, if a 
person had a private value of $5.50, he or she should realize that the next highest private value 
could be no less than $5.60, and the next lowest private value could be no higher than $5.40. 
The worst case would be for a bidder to tie another bidder, and have the winner determined by 
a coin toss. While such an individual increases his or her chances of losing the auction or 
earning a negative profit, it is unlikely that either occurrence will be actually realized because 
of their ten cent deviations in their bids. As mentioned earlier, the ten-cent leeway may appear 
safer as the trials progress. After trial one, some information regarding the induced value 
distribution is available, such that a subject who has a private value lower than the posted 
market price may realize he has no chance of winning the auction; hence the "decreasing your 
chances of winning the auction,, statement becomes less relevant when underbidding; and with 
it, the "increasing your chances of paying more than what the object is worth,, statement 
becomes less relevant when overbidding. Bids that were within ten cents of their private values 
(Bid ± 10 cents) were treated as if they were equal to their true values respectively. Table lO 
shows the new percentages after bids were allowed to fluctuate plus or minus ten cents from 
their true values. Compared to Table 9, Table 10 shows that the percentage of individuals who 
revealed their true preferences increased in both auctions in all three stages. Tables 9 supports 
that the Vickrey auction does a good job in measuring true preferences, and if some confidence 
interval is allowed, such as in Tab.le 10, the Vickrey auction performs even better. 
Discussion and Recommendations 
The results of this experiment bear several thoughts. In measuring " true" preferences, 
the Vickrey auction does a reasonable job. Although there are individuals who bid above or 
below their given private values, they do not deviate drastically. The deviations seem to be 
within the given environment with its rules and regulations. Our laboratory environment did not 
have severe punishment for strategic bidding below the market price, but it did have certain 
economic forces-such as increasing probabilities oflosing the auction as bidding progressively 
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Table 10. Frequencies ofBVR arranged by stages. 
Stage 1 
Vickrey 
nth 
pnce 
Stage 2 
Vickrey 
nth 
pnce 
Stage 3 
Vickrey 
nth 
pnce 
Bids al lowed to fluctuate ± 10 cents from value 
and still equal l. (Percentage in parenthesis) 
<1 = I > ] 
24 68 3 
(.2526) ( .7158) (.02 16) 
23 49 18 
(.2556) (.5444) (.2000) 
< ] = 1 > 1 
27 56 7 
(.3000) (.6222) (.0778) 
23 63 9 
(.2421 ) (.6632) (.0947) 
<l = 1 > ! 
20 63 12 
(.2105) (.6632) (.1263) 
2 1 61 8 
(.2333) (.6778) (.0889) 
25 
decreases from the induced value (especially for those in the upper hal f of the private-value 
distribution)-which prevented subjects from bidding dramatically away from their " true,, 
values. Furthermore, large departures from " true" values may be due to confusion or not 
widerstanding the experimental instructions--such as having participants where English is their 
second language. Such type of participants may be present in any experiment, and therefore we 
can not blame the Vickrey auction for its failure to produce all bids equal to all values (V i= b J· 
The concern about Vickrey auction' s failure to measure values seems to be unwarranted. 
Moreover, the random N-th price did not perfonn any better than the Vickrey. There is 
a logical reason why the random N-th price auction did no better than the Vickrey auction. 
Given if the Vickrey auction performs the best under the given circumstances, the random N-th 
price auction must either be equal to or less than the Vickrey auction in the same performance 
criteria. It seems illogical to kill a bird with two stones when the same can be done with one 
stone. Jn other words, using the random N-th price auction to measure value, when the Vickrey 
auction performs equal or better at the task in question, is overkill. 
Although our results show that the Vickrey auction :;::: random N-th price auction, we fail 
to answer the following question, "Why do people change their bids." To answer this question 
in the future, experiments may need to incorporate carefully structured questionnaires. Like any 
effective questionnaire, it should answer what it has sought out to answer; and it should contain 
questions which can be cross-referenced to test for validity and consistency. If such a well-
structured questionnaire can be developed, we may come closer to answering why people 
change their bids. The drawback is that such a questionnaire takes time to answer, and may 
distract the subjects since we normally do not fill out questionnaires when buying a market 
good. 
In redesigrung this experiment, it should attempt to incorporate some elaborate kind of 
questionnaire and increase the distribution in monetary terms to increase the profits as well as 
increase the losses. Moreover other independent variables may include: Optimal strategy told 
versus untold between groups; optimal strategy told versus untold within a group-say it before 
the third stage in an ABA format. This newer and "improved" experimental design will require 
26 
more groups, thus more participants, and it seems onJy appropriate to perform such a 
monumental task on a computer. Consequently, an appropriate computer program needs to be 
written, and as an uJtimate result, we may be able to find the answer to why people change their 
bids. 
27 
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS 
You will receive $10.00 for your participation in this experiment. Because you will be 
required to pay for any product purchased, your take home income may vary. 
The experiment has three stages. You will be bidding for tokens. In each stage, you will be 
asked to subntit your bidding price on the recording card. You may not reveal your bids to any 
other participant. 
Furthermore, each participant will be given an identification number and a private value 
before each stage. The identification number and the private vaJue must be kept confidential 
as well . The purpose of the identification number and the private vaJue will be explained a little 
later. 
Before the actual three stages of the experiment, a preliminary practice session will be 
conducted. During the practice session, you will take a brief quiz to determine whether or not 
you have understood the instructions. After the quiz, the answers will be discussed together, and 
any questions regarding the experimental procedures will be answered by the monitor. 
From the start to the finish of the experiment, there should be no communication between 
subjects. AJso, all items that are not part of this experiment shouJd be removed from the desks. 
Any violations of these requirements may result in your being ask to leave, and forfeiting all 
monies earned. 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
I . The experiment has three stages. 
2. Before each stage, you will receive a private value. In other words, you will receive a total 
of three private values-one before the beginrung of each stage. You may not reveal your private 
value to any other participant. 
3. Each stage will consist of 5 trial s. In each trial, you will be asked to submit your bids on a 
recording card. You may not reveal your bids to any other participant. 
4. 1n each stage, only one trial will be binding. This means that only one out of five trials will 
be binding. In essence, each trial has a 20 percent chance of being selected as the binding trial. 
Furthermore, profits (gained or lost) will be based solely on the results of the binding trial. 
5. Before the beginrung of the second and the third stage of the experiment, each auction winner 
from the preceding stage will receive a new identification number. You may not reveal your 
identification number to any other participant. 
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STAGE VA 
1. You will be given a private value for the auctioned good (a token). Thjs value must be kept 
confidential. These private values are determined randomly according to the following two-step 
procedure: 
STEP 1: Random numbers are drawn from a uniform distribution of [$0.10,$10.00] in 10 cent 
increments. A uniform distribution means that you have an equal chance of 
receiving any value from $0.10 to $10.00 in 10 cent increments. 
STEP 2: Private values of$X 1 through $X 10 (one for each bidder) are randomly assigned from 
the uniform distribution. In essence, your private value may be any of the following 
values with equal probability: $0.10, $0.20, ... ,$9.80, $9.90, $10.00. 
2. The private value you will receive is the value at which the monitor will buy the token back. 
3. Jn this auction, the highest bidder will win the auction, and earn a profit equal to his or her 
value less the second highest bid. 
For example, suppose the highest bid is 95 cents, the second highest bid is 70 cents, and the 
highest bidder's private value is $1 .00. The highest bidder will win the token and must pay 70 
cents (the second highest bid), and then the monitor will buy that token back from the highest 
bidder for $1.00 (highest bidder's private value). Consequently, the highest bidder will earn a 
profit of 30 cents ($1.00 - $0. 70). 
Now suppose the highest bid is $1.50, the second highest bid is $1.25, and the highest bidder's 
private value is $ 1.00. The highest bidder will win the token and must pay $ 1.25 (the second 
highest bid), and then the monitor will buy that token back from the highest bidder for $1. 00 
(highest bidder's private value). Consequently, the highest bidder will earn a negative profit or 
lose 25 cents ($ 1. 00 - $1.25). 
In case there is a tie for the highest bid, the winner wi ll be determined randomly by the 
monitor. 
(Your Private Value) 
- (2nd Highest Bid Price) 
Your Profit 
4. Please write your bid for the token on the recording card. Also please make sure you write 
your ID number and the trial number on the recording card. Then the monitor will collect the 
recording cards and display the highest bidder's ID number and the second highest bidding price 
(i.e. , the market price). 
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5. Your bids should be non-negative. Wbile you may bid above or below your private value, 
it is to your advantage to bid your true value. If you bid above your private value, you increase 
your chances of paying more than what the token is worth. And if you bid below your private 
value, you decrease your chances of winning the auction. 
6. There will be 5 trials 
7. Only 1 out of 5 trials will be binding. After the 5 trials, a number will be randomly selected 
to determine whjch trial is binding. The highest bidder for the binding trial will win the token 
and must pay the second highest bidding price. Next, the monjtor will buy that token back for 
the price equal to the highest bidder's private value. Your profit or loss will be based on the 
results from the binding trial only. 
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STAGE RA 
l. You will be given a private value for the auctioned good (a token). This value must be kept 
confidential. These private values are detennined randomly according to the following two-step 
procedure: 
STEP 1: Random numbers are drawn from a uniform distribution of [$0.10,$10.00] in 10 cent 
increments. A uniform distribution means that you have an equal chance of 
receiving any value from $0.10 to $10.00 in 10 cent increments. 
STEP 2: Private values of$X 1 through $X 10 (one for each bidder) are randomly assigned from 
the unifonn distribution. In essence, your private value may be any of the following 
values with equal probability: $0.10, $0.20, ... ,$9.80, $9.90, $10.00. 
2. The private value you will receive is the value at which the monitor will buy the token back. 
3. In this auction, the highest bidders (above the nth price) will win the auction, and earn a 
profit equal to his or her value less the nth highest bid, where n could take on values 2, 3, 4, or 
5. The value of n will be detennined randomly. 
For example, if the nth value was randomly selected to be 3, then the third highest price will 
be posted as the market price. Suppose the first highest bid is $1.50, the second highest bid is 
$1.00, and the third highest bid is 95 cents. Furthennore, assume that the highest bidder's 
private value is $1.60, and the second highest bidder's private value is 90 cents. The highest 
bidder and the second highest bidder will win the token and must pay 95 cents (the 3rd highest 
bid) respectively, and then the monitor will buy that token back from the highest bidder for 
$1.60 (highest bidder's private value) and from the second highest bidder for 90 cents (second 
highest bidder's private value). Consequently, the highest bidder will earn a profit of 65 cents 
($1 .60 - 0.95) and the second highest bidder will earn a negative profit or lose 5 cents ($0.90 -
$0.95). 
ln case there is a tie for the highest bids, the winner will be determined randomly by the 
monitor. 
(Your Private Value) 
- (nth highest bid price) 
Your Profit 
4. Please write your bid for the token on the recording card. Also please make sure you write 
your ID number and the trial number on the recording card. Then the monitor will collect the 
recording cards and display the highest bidders' ID numbers and the nth-highest bidding price 
(i .e., the market price). 
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5. Your bids should be non-negative. While you may bid above or below your private value, 
it is to your advantage to bid your true value. If you bid above your private value, you increase 
your chances of paying more than what the token is worth. And if you bid below your private 
value, you decrease your chances of winning the auction. 
6. There will be 5 trials 
7. Only l out of 5 trials will be binding. After the 5 trials, a number will be randomly selected 
to determine wruch trial is binding. The bidders above the nth-highest bidding price for the 
binding trial will win the token and must pay the nth-highest bidding price respectively. 
Following, the monitor will buy that token back from each auction winner for the price equal 
to his or her private value. Each auction winner's profit or loss will be based on the results from 
the binding trial onJy. 
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APPENDIX B. CHO\V TEST 
The following example uses the Auctt0nType variables. The restricted F-test is used to 
test the joint significance of a subset of independent variables. From our full (unrestricted) 
model : 
Bid = a + p ,PrivateValue + p2Trial 1 + P3Trial2 + p4Trial3 + P5T rial4 + 
P6AuctionType + P7Stage 1 + P8Stage2 T P9PrivateValue*Trial1 + 
p 10PrivateValue*Trial2 + p 11 PrivateValue*Trial3 +p 12Pri vateValue*Trial4 
+ p 13PrivateValue*AuctionType + p ,4PrivateValue*Stage1 + 
P15PrivateValue*Stage2 + E (i) 
we have reason to question whether significant explanatory power is provided by the 
AuctionType variables, therefore we run a restricted model with these variables removed: 
Bid = a + p1PrivateValue + P2Trial1 T P3Trial2 T P4Trial3 + p,Trial4 + P7Stage1 + 
P8Stage2+ P.?rivateValue*Trial1 + p10PrivateValue*Tria12 + 
p 11PrivateValue*Trial3 +p 12PrivateValue*Trial4 ..,.. p 14PrivateValue*Stage l 
+ P15PrivateValue*Stage2 + E (ii) 
If the Auction7ype variables contain significant explanatory power, the error sum of squares of 
the restricted model (ESSr) will be bigger than the error sum of squares from the unrestricted 
model (ESSu). We tested the following hypothesis: 
Ho: P6 = P 13 = 0 
H1 : at least one is not equal to zero 
We found that the F-ratio = 3.4825 is greater than the F-distribution table value at the 5% level 
of significance, hence the null hypothesis was rejected .. 
T he Chow test is used to test for the existence of a structural change. ln our case, we 
treat the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions as two subgroups, each from a separate 
regression. Equation (ii) is used as the restricted model. For the unrestricted model , the same 
equation (ii ) is used for each subgroup (Vickrey vs. random N-th price}, and ESS from the 
Vickrey subgroup is added to the ESS from the random N-th price group to give the unrestricted 
ESS. If structural change has occurred, the ESS, will be larger than the ES~ covering both 
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subgroups. We tested the following hypothesis: 
Ho: Po= Ao, P6 = A6, P13 = A13 
R. : At least one PJ * A.J 
We found that the F-ratio = 1.684 is less than the F-distribution table val.ue at the 5% level o f 
s ignificance, hence we failed to reject the null hypothesis. 
Which result appears to have more weight? T he answer is "It depends ... " In the Chow 
test, the inability to reject the null hypothesis implies that two separate regressions need not be 
estimated: the data can be pooled. While the Chow test takes into cons ideration a change in the 
intercept and the slope, the restricted F-test does not test for the significance of the intercept. 
The restricted F-test shows that the Auction Type variable has signi ficant explanatory power in 
the model, but does not treat the two different auctions structurally. If our concern is strictly on 
the changes in the slope, then the restricted F-test is appropriate . If we want to allow for 
changes in the slope and the intercept then the C how test is appropriate. 
In our study, we may want to allow for a change in the intercept as well as the slope. In 
time series analysis, the Chow test is used often to test for structural differences in two 
periods--say prior to a new legislative action and after the action is implemented. Our subjects 
were placed in one auction market, and then the auction market changes. Similarly since market 
changes are structural changes as if via legislative action and time, the C how test seems to carry 
more explanatory power. 
